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THE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT ON GLOBAL TERRORISM:
AN INFORMATION SYSTEM FAILURE?
Steven Alter
University of San Francisco
alter@usfca.edu
ABSTRACT
This case study concerns a system that generated a contentious U.S. State Department report on
global terrorism. For over 20 years, the Department produced and published an annual, nonclassified, retrospective Patterns of Global Terrorism report. However, the report for 2003,
published on April 29, 2004 was criticized as an attempt to misrepresent data for political
advantage. This case is based on official documents, transcripts, and news articles available on
the Internet in mid-July 2004. It summarizes the way the situation unfolded and provides a
glimpse at how people tried to figure out what happened and how to explain what happened.
Although this case occurred in a highly charged political environment, it involves many
information system and organizational issues that are important in building and maintaining
information systems, especially those that require categorization, coding, consolidation, and
interpretation of data regarding customers, employees, sales and service activities, and the
surrounding environment.
Keywords: information errors, coding of information, categorization of incidents, use of
information, information system failure, Terrorism Threat Integration Center
Editor's Note:
In information systems, we learn more from failure cases than we do from successes. Yet, private
companies usually bury information systems failures because they do not want the associated
bad publicity. Most of the published case data about failures are those that involve governments
or sensational courtroom trials1 [Flowers, 1996]. Therefore, to learn about recent failures you
must use examples from the headlines2. No matter what your political persuasion, the problems
encountered in 2004 with a seemingly simple accounting of the extent of terrorism are an
example of what can happen. In this case study, Steven Alter looks at the series of events that
transpired when the US. State Department reported that terrorism declined in 2003 from the
previous years and later redid its findings to say it may have increased The case is completely
constructed from official documents, published transcripts, and news articles that were accessed
1

Flowers, S. (1996) Software Failure: Management Failure; Amazing Stories and Cautionary Tales"
Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons
2
A classic example of learning from failure (and eventual success) is the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Allison, Graham T.(1971) Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1971.
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via the Internet. While the author recognizes the embarrassment and politically charged
atmosphere surrounding what was, perhaps only in part, an information system failure, the
case write up tries to be politically neutral and leaves to the student the considerations of the
interplay among the information system, the human use of the information system, and the
externalities that were involved.
The eight questions at the end of this case deal with the information systems aspects. They ask
students about :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

identifying the information system in this case,
comparing explanations of errors that occurred,
coding of information,
viewing the Patterns report as an MIS,
assuring that information is used appropriately,
increasing the value of the Patterns report,
producing the report more efficiently,
applying themes in this case to corporate information systems.

CAIS welcomes other views of this case or of similar cases from previous or current
administrations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his June 13, 2004 appearance on the widely viewed television program “Meet the Press,” Colin
Powell, United States Secretary of State, surely was not surprised by questions about errors in
the recently published 22nd annual report on Patterns of Global Terrorism. When the report was
published on April 29, 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage cited the data in the
report as evidence that the United States was prevailing in the war on terrorism. On May 17,
2004, a Washington Post article by two professors noted major flaws in the data reported and
argued that that the data contradicted Armitage’s claim. Congressman Henry Waxman sent
Powell a formal letter asking for corrections. It was clear that the report contained serious errors,
but the reasons for the errors were initially unclear. Some claimed the errors were accidental.
Others claimed they were intentional.
Tim Russert of NBC News raised the issue by playing a video clip of Armitage making his claim
about prevailing in the war on terrorism and noting that Congressman Henry Waxman “said that
you are manipulating data for political purposes.”
Powell responded …..
“The data that is in our report is incorrect.” … “Something happened in the data
collection, and we're getting to the bottom of it. Teams have been working for the last
several days and all weekend long. I'll be having a meeting in the department tomorrow
with CIA, other contributing agencies, the Terrorist Threat Information Center, and my
own staff to find out how these numbers got into the report. Some cutoff dates were
shifted from the way it was done in the past. There's nothing political about it. It was a
data collection and reporting error, and we'll get to the bottom of it and we'll issue a
corrected report. And I've talked to Congressman Waxman.” …
“When you look at it in hindsight now, and you look at the analysis given to me by
Congressman Waxman and these two [professors], all sorts of alarm bells should have
gone off. All sorts of, as I say to my staff, circuit breakers should have dropped when we
saw this data, and they didn't. But I don't think there was anything political or policy driven
about it. It was just data that was incorrect, or it wasn't properly measured compared to
the way it was measured in previous years. And so what we have to do is normalize the

The 2003 Annual Report on Global Terrorism: An Information System Failure? by S. Alter

78

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 14, 2004) 76-92

data this past year, 2003, in the same way that we normalized data in previous years,
and we will be putting out that corrected information as fast as we can.” 3
This case is organized chronologically and subdivided as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Establishment of the Terrorist Threat Information Center
Publication of Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2003 on April 29, 2004
Initial criticism of Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2003
Initial responses
Presentation of a revised Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2003 report on June 22,
2004
Press accounts of the explanation of the errors
Going forward

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER
In his State of the Union address on Jan. 29, 2003, President Bush announced the creation of a
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). On the previous day the White House distributed a
related fact sheet entitled “Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America.”4 Here are
selected bullet points from the fact sheet:
•

•

•
•

•

•

The President announced that he has instructed the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the FBI, working with the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and Defense to develop the Nation’s first unified Terrorist Threat
Integration Center. This new center will merge and analyze terrorist-related
information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most
comprehensive possible threat picture.”
“Elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI’s Counterterrorism
Division, the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center, and the Department of Defense will form
a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to fuse and analyze all-source information
related to terrorism.”
“The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will continue to close the “seam” between
analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.
Specifically, it will:
• Optimize use of terrorist threat-related information, expertise, and capabilities to
conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies.
• Create a structure that ensures information sharing across agency lines.
• Integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order
to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.
• Be responsible and accountable for providing terrorist threat assessments for our
national leadership.”
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will be headed by a senior U.S. Government
official, who will report to the Director of Central Intelligence. This individual will be
appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of
the FBI and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security.”
A senior multiagency team will finalize the details, design, and implementation
strategy for the stand-up of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center

3

U.S. Department of State, “Interview on NBC’s Meet the Press with Tim Russert,” June 13,
2004, online at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/33475.htm

4

The White House, “Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Protect America,” Jan. 28, 2003, online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html
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At a Feb. 26, 2003 hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee several senators
expressed concerns and issues about accountability and possible duplication of effort. Sen. Carl
Levin questioned whether all of the agencies had clearly delineated functions.
"I'd like to see an executive order or a decision by the agencies involved placing the
responsibility exactly where you say it is," Levin told the panel of FBI, CIA and of
Homeland Security Department officials. "We cannot blur it. We cannot duplicate it."
Without clear responsibilities, agencies will be able to "duck accountability," he said.5
Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) was concerned about similarity between the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center and the Counterterrorist Center, part of the CIA created in the mid-1980s to
collect and analyze terrorism information.
“Collins said she is concerned that the two centers would duplicate each other. Collins
and other members said they didn't want to create another layer of intelligence analysts,
further complicating the center's purpose.” 6
In March, 2003 the CIA announced that its deputy executive director, John Brennan, would lead
the TTIC from the CIA's side, but as late as April 23, 2003, one week before the TTIC was to
begin operation, the FBI had not nominated a counterpart from its side. Bobby Brady, the CIA’s
deputy chief information officer, voiced his organization’s displeasure.
“We don't agree with the FBI's decision to do this and reject the notion that this should be
a CIA-run organization," "We don't believe it should just be the CIA because the CIA is
just too vulnerable, and there would not be enough involvement from the FBI and other
agencies."7
Brady said he planned to meet with FBI officials “to pressure the FBI to name its leader for the
TTIC”.
"The FBI doesn't have to provide someone who is an [information technology] expert or
anything like that," Brady said, …. "All we need is someone who understands how the
FBI runs and can help out in getting this organization off the ground."8
On April 14, 2004, less than 15 months after the announcement of the plan to establish the TTIC,
its Director, John Brennan, testified about the capabilities that were already developed.
“[The TTIC] allows intelligence officials from several federal agencies to share threat
information using integrated databases and comprehensive search tools.” …“Analysts at
TTIC have direct access to 14 government networks, and officials plan to connect an
additional 10 networks.” .. “During the next year, officials will build the technology
infrastructure for faster search capabilities.”
"A key objective of TTIC is to develop an integrated information technology architecture
so that sophisticated analytical tools and search capabilities can be applied to the many
Terabytes of data available to the federal government," Brennan said. "We need to create
new knowledge from existing information."9

5

Michael, Sara. “Threat center raises questions, concerns,” Federal Computer Week. Feb. 26, 2003, online
at http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0224/web-ttic-02-26-03.asp
6
ibid.
7
French, Matthew, “CIA, FBI wrangle over threat center,” Federal Computer Week, April 23, 2003, online at
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0421/web-ciafbi-04-23-03.asp
8
Ibid.
9
Michael,
Sara.
“Feds
praise
TTIC,”
Federal
Computer
Week.
Online
at
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2004/0412/web-ttic-04-14-04.asp
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III. PUBLICATION OF PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM - 2003 ON APRIL 29, 2004
On April 29, 2004, the U.S. Department of State released the 22nd annual Patterns of Global
Terrorism report.10 Annual publication of this report is required by law. The report has used a
consistent definition of terrorism since 1983.11
In releasing the report, Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State provided comments
including:
“Terrorism continues to destroy the lives of people all over the world; and this report we
are releasing today, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2003," documents the sad toll that
such attacks took last year. This report also details the steps the United States and some
92 other nations took in 2003 to fight back and to protect our peoples. Indeed, you will
find in these pages clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight.” 12
The summary “Year in Review” section of Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2003 began:
“There were 190 acts of international terrorism in 2003, a slight decrease from the 198
attacks that occurred in 2002, and a drop of 45 percent from the level in 2001 of 346
attacks. The figure in 2003 represents the lowest annual total of international terrorist
attacks since 1969.
A total of 307 persons were killed in the attacks of 2003, far fewer than the 725 killed
during 2002. A total of 1,593 persons were wounded in the attacks that occurred in 2003,
down from 2,013 persons wounded the year before. In 2003, the highest number of
attacks (70) and the highest casualty count (159 persons dead and 951 wounded)
occurred in Asia. There were 82 anti-US attacks in 2003, which is up slightly from the 77
attacks the previous year, and represents a 62-percent decrease from the 219 attacks
recorded in 2001.”
The report noted:

10
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, April 29, 2004. Online at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/ pgtrpt/2003/31569pf.htm. The full
report in a revised version from June 22, 2004 is online at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/
11
Each year this report “is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section
2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on
terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required
by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts
occurred and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to
Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.”

The definition of terrorism from previous Patterns of Global Terrorism reports applied to the 2003 report. “No
one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance.” [These reports use] the definition of terrorism
contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following
definitions:
•
The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
/
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience.
•
The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one
country.
•
The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice,
international terrorism.
The US Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since
1983.” (Source: U.S. Department of State, “Introduction,” Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000, April 30,
2001, online at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2419.htm)
12
U.S. Department of State, “Release of the 2003 ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ Annual Report,” online at
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/31961.htm
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“Most of the attacks that have occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom do not meet the longstanding US definition of international terrorism
because they were directed at combatants, that is, US and Coalition forces on duty.
Attacks against noncombatants, that is, civilians and military personnel who at the time of
the incident were unarmed and/or not on duty, are judged as terrorist attacks.”
IV. INITIAL CRITICISM OF PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM - 2003
Contradicting the conclusions presented by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, a May 17, 2004
article13 in the Washington Post by Professors Alan Krueger of Princeton and David Laitin of
Stanford included the following points:
• The data in the report supported conclusions opposite from those drawn by Deputy
Secretary Armitage. Instead of decreasing, “the number of significant terrorist attacks
actually increased by 36 percent, from 124 in 2001 to 169 in 2003. The number of
terrorist events has risen each year since 2001, and in 2003 reached its highest level in
more than 20 years.”
• The data highlighted in the report are “ill-defined and subject to manipulation,” giving
“disproportionate weight to the least important terrorist acts.”
• The State Department would not identify the panel that determines whether an event is
significant, nor would it say how insignificant events are counted. (An event "is judged
significant if it results in loss of life or serious injury to persons" or "major property
damage.")
• The report lists none of the serious terrorist events that occurred after Nov. 11, 2003.
On the same date, May 17, 2004, Henry Waxman, a Congressman from California, sent a letter14
to Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State. Its first paragraph stated:
“Last month, the Department of State released its annual Patterns of Global Terrorism
report, announcing that international terror was on the decline in 2003. It appears,
however, that the decline in terrorism reported by the State Department results from
manipulation of the data, not an actual decline in terrorism incidents. This manipulation
may serve the Administration’s political interests, but it calls into serious doubt the
integrity of the report.”
Waxman’s letter cited analysis by Professors Krueger and Laitin and mentioned errors, questions
of interpretation, and lack of cooperation in validating the reported conclusions:
“A close review of the document reveals that the list of significant incidents stops on
November 11. This is not because terror stopped for the last seven weeks of the year. In
fact, there were multiple international terror attacks after that date – including the deadly
bombings of two synagogues, a bank, and a British consulate in Turkey. A State
Department representative told my staff that the list was cut off due to a printing
deadline.”
The State Department’s claim that terrorism is on the decline is based solely on a steep
decrease in the number of ‘non-significant’ terror attacks since 2001. According to the
data in the report, these attacks have declined more than 90% in two years. But the

13

Krueger, Alan B. and David Laitin, “Faulty Terror Report Card,” Washington Post, May 17, 2004, p. A21.
Online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31971-2004May16.html
14
Waxman, Henry, Letter to Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, dated May 17, 2004. Online at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/waxman051704.pdf

The 2003 Annual Report on Global Terrorism: An Information System Failure? by S. Alter

82

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 14, 2004) 76-92

report does not provide any explanation for how or why this drastic decline in
nonsignificant attacks has occurred.
In an effort to understand why the State Department reported that nonsignificant terrorism
attacks dropped from 231 in 2001 to less than 21 in 2003, my staff asked for a list of the
nonsignificant attacks. The Department, however, refused to disclose either the list of
total attacks or the process by which these attacks are selected for inclusion in the list.
This leads to the bizarre conclusion that each significant terror attack is detailed in a
public report, but information regarding the nonsignificant attacks is withheld from
Congress.”
…”Simply put, it is deplorable that the State Department report would claim that terrorism
attacks are decreasing when in fact significant terrorist activity is at a 20-year high.”
Waxman’s letter concluded with a request that by June 1 the State Department should provide
detailed listings of all international terrorist attacks since 1995, should identify the members of the
U.S. Government Incident Review Panel, and should explain “the procedures for defining an act
as an international terrorist attack and whether those procedures have changed in recent years.”
V. INITIAL RESPONSES
The reported errors in Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2003 were a serious embarrassment for the
Administration and for Colin Powell in particular. Here are excerpts from a number of initial
responses, including a report by the Congressional Reporting Service15, a statement from the
State Department, and several news articles from media across the political spectrum:
“The Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and
Related Issues,”16 Congressional Research Service report by Raphael Perl, dated June 1, 2004.
“This report highlights trends and data found in the State Department’s annual Patterns
of Global Terrorism report, (Patterns 2003) and addresses selected issues relating to its
content.”
“Notably, the report defines terrorist acts as incidents directed against noncombatants.
Thus, attacks in Iraq on military targets are not included.”
“Patterns, a work widely perceived as a standard, authoritative reference tool on terrorist
activity, trends, and groups, has been subject to periodic criticism that it is unduly
influenced by domestic, other foreign policy, political and economic considerations.”
“This year for the first time, data contained in Patterns — which some critics in Congress
view as incomplete if not flawed — was provided by the newly operational Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC). TTIC is providing an errata sheet, which will include,
among other information, data on terrorist attacks after November 11, 2003.”
“Some critics of Patterns and its designation of state sponsors of terrorism charge that
the Patterns 2003 report generally, and specifically its reporting of activities of nations, is
unduly influenced by a complex web of overlapping and sometimes competing political
and economic agendas and concerns.”

15

“The Congressional Research Service is the public policy research arm of the United States Congress. As
a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS works exclusively and directly for Members
of Congress, their Committees and staff on a confidential, nonpartisan basis.” Source: “About CRS,”
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/whatscrs.html#hismiss
16
Perl, Raphael. “The Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors,
and Related Issues,” Congressional Research Service Order Code RL32417, June 1, 2004. Online at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/33630.pdf
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“Particularly strong have been suggestions by some that Patterns plays down
undesirable levels of counter-terrorism cooperation and progress in the case of nations
seen as vital to the global campaign against terror. Patterns 2003, in contrast to pre
“9/11” report versions, is silent about Pakistan’s alleged ongoing support for Kashmiri
militants and their attacks against the population of India.”
“In light of the high level of international attention attached to the report and the increased
complexity and danger posed by the terrorist threat, some observers have suggested that
a thorough Executive/Congressional review of Patterns, its structure and content, may be
timely and warranted.”
“Terror attacks undercounted,”17 by Josh Meyer, Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2004.
“The State Department is scrambling to revise its annual report on global terrorism to
acknowledge that it understated the number of deadly attacks in 2003, amid charges that
the document is inaccurate, dangerously outmoded and politically manipulated by the
Bush administration.”
“Several State Department officials vehemently denied that their report was swayed by
politics. One senior official characterized the errors as clerical, and blamed them mostly
on the fact that responsibility for the report recently shifted from the CIA to the
administration's new Terrorist Threat Integration Center.”
“Correction to Global Patterns of Terrorism Will be Issued,”18 a press statement issued on June
10, 2004 by Richard Boucher, spokesman for the U.S. Department of State. The entire text is:
“After learning of possible discrepancies in the first week of May, the Department of State
and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center initiated a review of the data published in the
2003 edition of “Patterns of Global Terrorism.” A May 17th letter from Congressman
Waxman added impetus to our efforts.
The data in the report was compiled by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which was
established in January 2003 and includes elements from the CIA, FBI and Departments
of Homeland Security and Defense. Based on our review, we have determined that the
data in the report is incomplete and in some cases incorrect. Here at the Department of
State, we did not check and verify the data sufficiently.
At our request, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center is revising the statistics for
calendar year 2003. While we are still checking data for accuracy and completeness, we
can say that our preliminary results indicate that the figures for the number of attacks and
casualties will be up sharply from what was published. As soon as we are in a position to,
we will issue corrected numbers, a revised analysis, and revisions to the report.”
“State Dept.: Terror Report Incorrect,”19 an Associated Press article posted on Fox News Channel
on June 10, 2004:
“The State Department acknowledged Thursday it was wrong in reporting terrorism
declined worldwide last year. Instead, both the number of incidents and the toll in victims
increased sharply, the department said. Statements by senior administration officials
claiming success were based "on the facts as we had them at the time. The facts that we
had were wrong," department spokesman Richard Boucher said.”
17

Meyer, Josh, “Terror attacks undercounted,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2004 online at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/06/09/MNGUG734ER1.DTL
18
U.S. Department of State. “Correction to Global Patterns of Terrorism Will be Issued,” June 10, 2004.
Online at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/33433.htm
19
Fox News Channel, “State Dept.: Terror Report Incorrect,” June 10, 2004, online at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,122403,00.html
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“Secretary of State Colin Powell said Thursday the errors were partly the result of new
data collection procedures. "I can assure you it had nothing to do with putting out
anything but the most honest, accurate information we can," he said.”
“State Dept. Concedes Error in Terror Data”20 by R. Jeffrey Smith in the Washington Post, June
10, 2004:
“Larry C. Johnson, a former CIA analyst and former deputy director of State's
counterterrorism office … "said the report also omitted from the list of significant acts of
terrorism, for unknown reasons, the 13 terrorist attacks in Russia attributed to Chechens
in 2003, which he said caused the deaths of 244 people. Although most significant
attacks occurred in just two countries in 2002 -- Israel and India -- they occurred in 10 in
2003, Johnson said: Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Morocco, the Philippines,
Saudi Arabia, Russia and Turkey.
"When you read the report, TTIC did not add [the data] properly. Even a third-grader
could have found this," Johnson said. "The body counts in 2002 and 2003 were at the
highest levels in history."
“Powell 'not a happy camper' about terror report,”21 posted on CNN.com on June 13, 2004
included the following:
“Secretary of State Colin Powell found himself regretting and backpedaling Sunday for
the second time in a month as he acknowledged that an erroneous terror report was a
mistake and insisted politics did not lead to the report's omissions.”
“Powell said on NBC's "Meet the Press" that "the data that is within the report -- the
actual number of incidents -- is wrong."
“Henry Waxman said the 2003 report did not include attacks that happened after the
report's November 11 printing deadline. That deadline prevented the inclusion of the
bombings of two synagogues, the British consulate and a bank in Istanbul later that
month, among other attacks.”
An article22 by the editor of the South Asia Intelligence Review in India, (which has had
dangerous border disputes and military confrontations with Pakistan) noted:
“The Report speaks of a total of 190 incidents of terrorism globally, in which 307 persons
were killed. … [including] just 49 such incidents in [India], with a total of 99 fatalities .. in
the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The reality is that in J&K alone, there were at least 477
attacks on civilians in year 2003, with a total of 658 civilian deaths recorded by the South
Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) from open source reports.” … [The Report describes
Pakistan as] “among America's ‘most important partners in the global coalition against
terrorism’.” … “There is not a single negative reference to trends in terrorism in Pakistan.”

20

Smith, R. Jeffrey. “State Dept. Concedes Error in Terror Data,” Washington Post, June 10, 2004, p. A17.
Online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29664-2004Jun9.html
21
CNN.com,
“Powell
‘not
a
happy
camper’
about
terror
report,”
online
at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/13/powell.report
22
Sahni, Ajai, “A Tale Told by an Idiot,” India Outlook.com, June 17, 2004, online at
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20040617&fname=ajaisahni&sid=1&pn=1. Also available at
http://www.kashmirherald.com/featuredarticle/pgt2003.html
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VI. PRESENTATION OF A REVISED PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM – 2003 REPORT
ON JUNE 22, 2004
On June 22, 2004, the U.S. Department of State released a corrected version of the Patterns of
Global Terrorism report for 2003. The revised summary section entitled “Year in Review” began,
“There were 208 acts of international terrorism in 2003, a slight increase from the most
recently published figure of 198 attacks in 2002, and a 42 percent drop from the level in
2001 of 355 attacks.
A total of 625 persons were killed in the attacks of 2003, fewer than the 725 killed during
2002. A total of 3646 persons were wounded in the attacks that occurred in 2003, a sharp
increase from 2013 persons wounded the year before. This increase reflects the
numerous indiscriminate attacks during 2003 on “soft targets,” such as places of worship,
hotels, and commercial districts, intended to produce mass casualties.”23
According to the published transcript of the presentation,24 Ambassador Cofer Black, Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, began the presentation by saying,
“The 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism was marred by significant errors. Over the past
few weeks in particular, the past several days and nights, my staff here and John's at
TTIC, and others in the U.S. Government counterterrorism community have conducted a
comprehensive review of the figures in the 2003 Patterns report. We’ve revisited both the
numbers themselves and the way we arrived at them. From the reexamination, we have
concluded there were obvious problems with some of the numbers themselves. Events
were left out. Some were mislabeled and counted in the wrong categories. Some events
were counted twice and some portions of the year were omitted entirely.
I hope it goes without saying that we’ve already begun the process of improving the way
we arrive at these numbers for future reports. The revised figures indicate that our earlier
assessment was overly positive in some respects.
… I want to be very clear: We here in the Counterterrorism Office, and I personally,
should have caught any errors that marred the Patterns draft before we published it. But I
assure you and the American people that the errors in the Patterns report were honest
mistakes, and certainly not deliberate deceptions as some have speculated, as I said,
when the Patterns was released.”
Ambassador Black summarized the revised results and then yielded the microphone to John
Brennan, Director of the TTIC, who provided background about why the erroneous results
occurred:
“Numerous factors contributed to the inaccurate information contained in the 2003
Patterns of Global Terrorism publication. TTIC provided incomplete statistics to CIA,
which incorporated those statistics into material passed to the Department of State. The
statistics were generated by a longstanding interagency review process and database
over which TTIC assumed administrative control in May 2003. No changes were made to
that process by TTIC and the same database was used to compile the statistics for the
2003 Patterns publication that was used in previous years.
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U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism,” Released by the Bureau of Resource
Management and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, June 22, 2004. Online at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/33771.htm.
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I must point out that this database is retrospective in focus and is not used to monitor,
track or analyze current terrorist threats.
There was insufficient review and quality control throughout the entire data compilation,
drafting and publication process, including the inaccurate and incomplete database
numbers provided by TTIC. I assume personal responsibility for any shortcomings in
TTIC's performance and I regret any embarrassment this issue has caused the
Department or the Secretary.
Anyone who might assert that the numbers were intentionally skewed is mistaken. Over
the past several weeks, TTIC personnel have conducted rigorous review of the database,
computer technology, procedures, interagency process, methodology, criteria and
definitions that have been used to compile international terrorism statistics over the past
20 years. This review has exposed serious deficiencies and ambiguities that need to be
addressed immediately. As a result, I have directed that the interagency process that has
been used to compile statistics and to support the Department in its annual Patterns
publication be overhauled and that changes be made in the staffing, database and
computer technology involved in this effort.”
Brennan implied that performing the analysis for a retrospective annual report was not TTIC’s top
priority.
“To date, TTIC's technical and analytic focus has been on how we, as a government, can
more effectively identify, integrate and correlate intelligence, law enforcement, homeland
security and other terrorism-related information to prevent future terrorist attacks. While
this focus will remain our number one priority, and we will allocate analytic and budget
resources accordingly, we will put in place a system in conjunction with our partner
agencies that will provide accurate and meaningful metrics on international terrorist
events. The Department must have confidence that whatever information it receives from
TTIC is accurate.”
Brennan continued by responding to concerns that the method for coding the incidents as
significant or non-significant was not applied consistently with previous reports
“I would now like to say a few words about the revised statistics, charts and chronologies
that are being made available today. When it was brought to our attention that the
information in Patterns was incorrect, TTIC staff conducted a thorough review of all
reported terrorist incidents that took place in 2003. On the basis of that review, a total of
208 incidents were determined to meet the definition of international terrorism as
articulated in Section 2656f of Title 22 of the U.S. Code. One hundred and seventy-five of
these incidents met the threshold for Significant Incidents as defined by the Incident
Review Panel, known as the IRP, which is an interagency panel established in the early
1980s consisting of representatives of CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
Since May of 2003, a member of TTIC has chaired this panel and has voted in cases of
tie. The interagency Incident Review Panel is the body that makes the decisions on
international terrorist incidents. In addition to the 176 Significant Incidents, TTIC staff
identified another 33 incidents that were deemed Non-Significant, according to the
definition established by the Incident Review Panel many years ago.
The definitions for Significant and Non-Significant International Terrorist Incidents are
included in the material that is being provided today. These 208 total incidents, including
the breakdown between Significant and Non-Significant, were then reviewed and
validated at a special session of the Incident Review Panel that was convened last week.
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One final point. Frequently, there is incomplete and often contradictory information
available on reported terrorist events. Thus, it is up to the Incident Review Panel to make
the best possible decisions on whether incidents meet the established definitions and
thresholds, as well as to make informed judgments on the number of casualties involved.
The materials being made available today reflect those decisions and judgments.”
The reporters at the presentation followed with a lengthy series of questions and answers about a
wide range of topics. The following excerpts were selected to emphasize questions and answers
that directly or indirectly explain something about the systems that produced the initial report and
the circumstances under which it was generated. Lines containing dashes indicate breaks in the
chronology within the question and answer session.
QUESTION: I wonder if you gentlemen can tell me -- you've accepted responsibility now - is anybody going to be fired or disciplined or has anybody resigned as a result of this
very embarrassing mistake that seems to have involved several people in systems and
layers?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: Well, I think that we've got a lot of hardworking people doing a
lot of different things. And we have been looking at the architecture, the process involved
with this. We're going to look at the entire spectrum of how the information is stored, how
it's put together both here at the State Department and particularly at the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center
… And this was an error of commission, but it was one developed over a significant
period of time. We're dealing with old equipment and how we store it, being able to
extract information out of the computers. We've got to update our equipment. And I think
we will be able to develop a product that's more meaningful.
… Obviously, no one would want this to happen. I want to leave you with the sense that
these are very hardworking, well-intentioned people that do make mistakes. There is the
omission in the chronology – but not in the narrative, but in the chronology, there is an
omission from about the 11th of November onwards. And the vote of the Incident Review
Panel was -- in the process of December -- should have been caught clearly. And we're
still amazed it was not, but it was not. And not to make excuses, but the people in our
shop as well as John's and in other agencies at that time were working around the clock,
were not on holiday. We all missed Christmas and the holidays. We were looking at
saving lives -- as you remember, the aviation threat -- we were addressing that and other
issues.
---------------QUESTION: Why were [the incidents in mid-November and December] not counted?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: A couple of issues here. One is that the initial request that came
in at the end of December and early January of the statistics. The Incident Review Panel
did not meet until the middle of January in order to review those incidents in the latter half
of November and in the month of December. When those incidents were determined to
be Significant or Non-Significant, they were input into the database. Now, this database is
an exceptionally antiquated database. It has been in use for more than 10 years, one that
TTIC inherited and one that we now understand exactly its flaws and its deficiencies.
When they were input and it was input through only two parts of this database, they didn't
spill over then to the other side that would actually generate the statistics. They were still
captured in the database. Therefore, when the statistics and the chronologies that were
built from those statistics were provided to CIA, it only stopped -- it only provided those -that information up to the 11th of November. And, therefore, when that information went
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forward, as I said, there was inattention as far as the quality control and reviewing and
seeing whether or not there was a complete statistical run at that time.
QUESTION: That doesn't explain the 8th of November attack in Saudi.
AMBASSADOR BLACK: Well, what I said was then we also -- TTIC staff did a thorough
review of all the terrorist incidents that were reported in 2003. Some of those incidents
were deemed to be not international terrorist incidents. When our staff went back and
took a look at them, in fact, they did meet the threshold for international terrorism. So you
will see many changes throughout the course of the year as far as incidents that were
included in Patterns that had been taken out and new incidents that have been put in
prior to November 11th. This is a result of a thorough and constant review over the last
two weeks and the analysts involved have scrubbed all of this information and that is why
the special Incident Review Panel was convened last week in order to validate that.
QUESTION: But, in plainer English, isn't the answer to that question that this was a
computer error?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: It is a combination of things. There was a transition from CIA to
TTIC. There was the individual who was responsible for this unit left the position in
December and was not replaced, has not yet been replaced. It's a CIA officer who left.
There were individual contractors who actually had the inputting responsibilities for the
database. Contractors rotated. And so the individual who was in charge of those
contractors who left and the contractors then mis-input the new information into the
database. So it was a combination of things: inattention, personnel shortages and
database that is awkward and is antiquated and needs to have very proficient input be
made in order for to be sure that the numbers will spill then to the different categories that
are being captured.
QUESTION: Excuse me, if I could follow up? Then the failure, apparently, was that once
this flawed information went to the CIA, it was not properly vetted there? And, similarly, it
then went to the State Department where it was also not properly, if at all, vetted? Is that
what happened?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: I will leave it to CIA and State Department to talk about the
review that was provided to that information.
QUESTION: Well, we don't have them or we don't have the CIA here. What’s your
understanding?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: My understanding is that the incomplete and inaccurate
statistics that TTIC provided to CIA was then passed on to State Department in its same
form.
-----------QUESTION: Yes. Ambassador Black, aren't you even now, with the corrected numbers,
understating the problem? You said that terrorism -- terrorist incidents are down from
where they were in 2001. In fact, if you look at Significant events, which are the ones, by
definition, that we care about -- this is where there are casualties -AMBASSADOR BLACK: Have gone up.
QUESTION: -- have gone up and are at a 20-year high. Is it not right -- they’re at a 20year high with these new numbers?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: That is correct, in terms of the 175 figure.
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QUESTION: A 20-year high. Why didn't you mention that? I mean, it's not in the report.
You have this -- the spin seems to be here that we're in a situation where, yeah, it's up a
little bit from last year but it's not as high as it was in 2001. But what matters, the
Significant events, a 20-year high. That's a different story.
AMBASSADOR BLACK: I think you need -- well, what I'm trying to get to is, you know,
one can emphasize various things. I think in my statement I've repeatedly said Significant
events, and I pointed out 175, I said it is a high, that is true. You know, it is a high
statistically. There are other, you know, there are other -- 168 is a reasonably close
figure. You know, you can look at this and I guess it's like a Rorschach test. You know,
you can see what you want.
-------QUESTION: -- which would seem to be the genesis of the errors? It seemed to me that
you initially said that the information was correctly inputted into your antiquated database,
then for some reason it was not totaled, and then later you said that it was incorrectly
inputted.
MR. BRENNAN: No, I did not say it was correctly inputted. I said that there was
information that was subsequently inputted into the database that was not generated then
when the database was pulsed. So some of the information from November and
December was, in fact, input. But, in fact, looking back over the entire year, including that
period, there were some incidents that should have been deemed to be international
terrorist events.
QUESTION: Okay. So it was put in, but it just wasn't counted right, then, once it was put
in?
MR. BRENNAN: Once it goes into the database, it's another step, in fact, several steps
based on this database system that requires the individuals to generate the statistics
based on incidents and whether they are Significant, Non-Significant, and casualties,
whatever. That extraction process did not work for a combination of database problems,
individuals who were not sufficiently trained on that, apparently, and also that there was
lack of management oversight there because of the individual who was in charge of that
unit left.
-----------QUESTION: Just to clarify, the initial failure was the computer and programming input
problem that was described by Mr. Brennan, then there was an apparent lack of vetting
by the CIA, although you have not said so explicitly. And then, was there also a failure at
the State Department to vet the material as received from those sources before you put it
out? And has that now changed? Can you describe -- can you just clarify that?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: We are in the process of changing that and looking at it. Clearly,
since I am the one that recommend to the Secretary that this document be published, it is
my responsibility that it be error-free. It was not.
We do rely upon the TTIC and the CIA to provide us accurate information. And you've
heard from Mr. Brennan about the plans he is making, both in terms of technology and
personnel, to do that. But we, in my office, have to do a better job of proofreading what
we get, and we obviously didn't do a good enough job of that and we're going to make
corrections to do that.
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VII. PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE EXPLANATION OF THE ERRORS
Many press accounts on or shortly after June 22, 2004 discussed the presentation of the revised
report and the skeptical questioning of Director Brennan and Ambassador Black. The following
excerpts from news accounts were selected because they express additional views of Brennan
and Black’s explanation of the errors or of the surrounding context. Numerous comments about
the national political ramifications of the errors and the new results are not included below. Direct
quotations from Brennan and Black are not included because they were presented above.
“State Department Report Shows Increase in Terrorism25 by Steven Weisman of the New York
Times included:
“With fewer than 150 employees, [the TTIC] is supposed to analyze threats reported
overseas and domestically and figure out from where the next attacks may come.”
“C.I.A. and State Department officials passed what they regarded as a tedious job of
producing statistics for the annual report to the unit, which was understaffed and
handicapped by turnover, old computers, software that did not work and other problems.”
“But some officials said Tuesday that the statistics themselves are arbitrary, dictated by
American law. For example, the report does not include attacks by citizens of a country
against citizens of the same country, because these are not regarded as ‘international"
terrorism’.”
“Data Were Wrong on Terror Deaths”26 by David Cloud of the Wall Street Journal included:
“Officials said the main reason for the inaccuracies was the failure to count several
attacks last November and December. That happened, officials said, because the CIA
supervisor who oversaw entry of terror statistics into a database, as well as several
contractor employees, left their jobs around this time, officials said.”
“Messrs. Powell and Black repeatedly declined yesterday to offer conclusions about what
the corrected numbers showed about the progress of the terror war. Democrats seized
on the corrected numbers, saying that they were part a trend in which administration
officials ignored or played down evidence at odds with their portrayal of the terror war.”
“New 2003 Data: 625 Terrorism Deaths, not 307”27 by Peter Slevin of the Washington Post
included:
“Powell, reported by colleagues to be furious about the errors in this year’s Patterns of
Global Terrorism review, noted three times in a short statement Tuesday that Brennan’s
office reports to the CIA director.”
“’Powell pointed to ‘computational and accounting errors.’ He added: ‘The American
people can have confidence in what we are doing and what we have done’."
“’Waxman said of Powell, ‘I'm going to give him the benefit of the doubt that they're
simply incompetent, but even that's distressing.’ He called it shocking that the
administration produced a ‘basically useless’ report on such a critical topic’.”
“Updated Terror Report Shows Rise in Incidents,”28 an Associated Press article posted on Fox
News on June 23, 2004:
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“J. Cofer Black, who heads the department's counterterrorism office, said the report, even
as revised, showed "we have made significant progress" in the campaign against
international terror.”
“The corrected report shows that the Bush administration is "playing fast and loose with
the truth when it comes to the war on terror," said Phil Singer, spokesman for Sen. John
Kerry's presidential campaign. The administration "has now been caught trying to inflate
its success on terrorism," he said.”
“State Department Issues Revised Terrorism Report”29 by Mary Curtius of the Los Angeles Times
included:
“Waxman said that in his telephone conversations with Powell, the secretary was
‘outraged’ that errors had found their way into the published report.”
“Yeah, I don't like being picked off first base like that," [Powell] said. "But so far I haven't
found malfeasance or any willingness to do wrong on the part of anyone. But we'll tighten
up our procedures, but I haven't found anything here that I would say is deserving of
firing, if that's the question,”
VIII. GOING FORWARD
As of the end of the case, Colin Powell is surely embarrassed by what happened and also upset
that he had to spend his time dealing with errors in a retrospective annual report instead of
devoting his energy to crises and important international issues around the world. Looking
forward he and his senior staff might decide to fix the system for producing the report in its
current form. Alternatively, they might conclude that in its current form and with its current
definitions and restrictions the report is basically a bureaucratic exercise that fulfills a decades-old
Congressional mandate but fails to reflect today’s issues. Powell and his senior staff must deal
with difficult national and international issues. Deciding what to do about annual Patterns of
Global Terrorism report cannot be a major priority for them, but they still have to decide what to
do.
QUESTIONS
1. Take an information system view of the production of the Patterns of Global Terrorism report.
Review the case and summarize the system as follows:
a. Summarize the main steps in the business process
b. Identify the main participants in the system
c. Identify the information used and created by the system.
d. Identify the technology used by the system.
e. Identify the product produced by the system.
f. Identify different aspects of the surrounding organizational, political, and security
environment that were relevant to the system.
2. The various sources in this case study provide a variety of explanations about how the errors
occurred in the original (April 29, 2004) version of the report. Identify at least three different
reasons that were cited and explain how the reasons are related to information systems and
organizations.
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3. To produce the Patterns of Global Terrorism report it is necessary to decide which incidents
qualify as international terrorist incidents and then to classify each incident as significant or nonsignificant. How are these decisions made and how should they be made? Identify business
situations in marketing, sales, human resource management, or other business functions in which
the quality of important information depends on how well people put things in categories.
4. The corrected report is available at the URL in footnote #10. To what extent is it possible to
consider the report a management information system? To whom is it addressed?
5. An important issue for managers is to assure that the information is used appropriately.
Looking at the case, identify examples of using or misusing information. What might be done in
the future to make sure information from the report is used appropriately?
6. Aside from minimizing errors, what might be done to make the report more valuable for
purposes related to monitoring and management of issues related to terrorism? Start from one of
two basic premises:
a. The U.S. Government should use its resources to continue publishing the report based
on the long-standing definitions of terrorism and international terrorism.
b. The U.S. Government should produce a different report that more correctly reflects the
current world situation regarding terrorism at local, national, and international levels.
7. Assume you have been hired to figure out how to make the production of the report more
efficient. Based on the limited details about how the report is generated, identify some of your
initial guesses about what, if anything, might be done more efficiently or more effectively.
8. Most companies use a variety of information systems for keeping track of internal operations,
finances, employees, customers, and the marketplace. Going beyond the details of this case,
identify some of the major themes and issues from this case that are also pertinent to corporate
information systems.
Editor’s Note: This case study, which was peer reviewed, was received on July 22, 2004 and was
published on August 1, 2004.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Steven Alter is Professor of Information Systems at the University of San Francisco. He holds a
B.S. in mathematics and Ph.D. in management science from MIT. He extended his 1975 Ph.D.
thesis into one of the first books on decision support systems. After teaching at the University of
Southern California he served for eight years as co-founder and Vice President of Consilium, a
manufacturing software firm that went public in 1989 and was acquired by Applied Materials in
1998. His many roles at Consilium included starting departments for customer service, training,
documentation, technical support, and product management. Upon returning to academia, he
wrote an information systems textbook that is currently in its fourth edition, Information Systems:
Foundation of E-business. His research for the last decade concerned developing systems
analysis concepts and methods that can be used by typical business professionals and can
support communication with IT professionals. His articles appear in Harvard Business Review,
Sloan Management Review, MIS Quarterly, Interfaces, Communications of the ACM,
Communications of the AIS, CIO Insight, Futures, The Futurist, and many conference
transactions.
Copyright © 2004 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard copies of
all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and full citation on
the first page. Copyright for components of this work owned by others than the Association for Information
Systems must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on
servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to publish
from: AIS Administrative Office, P.O. Box 2712 Atlanta, GA, 30301-2712 Attn: Reprints or via e-mail from
ais@gsu.edu

The 2003 Annual Report on Global Terrorism: An Information System Failure? by S. Alter

ISSN: 1529-3181
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Paul Gray
Claremont Graduate University
AIS SENIOR EDITORIAL BOARD
Detmar Straub
Vice President Publications
Georgia State University
Edward A. Stohr
Editor-at-Large
Stevens Inst. of Technology

Paul Gray
Editor, CAIS
Claremont Graduate University
Blake Ives
Editor, Electronic Publications
University of Houston

Sirkka Jarvenpaa
Editor, JAIS
University of Texas at Austin
Reagan Ramsower
Editor, ISWorld Net
Baylor University

CAIS ADVISORY BOARD
Gordon Davis
University of Minnesota
Jay Nunamaker
University of Arizona

Ken Kraemer
Univ. of Calif. at Irvine
Henk Sol
Delft University

M.Lynne Markus
Bentley College
Ralph Sprague
University of Hawaii

Richard Mason
Southern Methodist Univ.
Hugh J. Watson
University of Georgia

Jaak Jurison
Fordham University

Jerry Luftman
Stevens Inst.of Technology

CAIS SENIOR EDITORS
Steve Alter
U. of San Francisco

Chris Holland
Manchester Bus. School

CAIS EDITORIAL BOARD
Tung Bui
University of Hawaii
Omar El Sawy
Univ. of Southern Calif.

Fred Davis
U.ofArkansas, Fayetteville
Ali Farhoomand
University of Hong Kong

Candace Deans
University of Richmond
Jane Fedorowicz
Bentley College

Donna Dufner
U.of Nebraska -Omaha
Brent Gallupe
Queens University

Robert L. Glass
Computing Trends
Ruth Guthrie
California State Univ.

Sy Goodman
Ga. Inst. of Technology
Alan Hevner
Univ. of South Florida

Joze Gricar
University of Maribor
Juhani Iivari
Univ. of Oulu

Ake Gronlund
University of Umea,
Munir Mandviwalla
Temple University

Sal March
Vanderbilt University
Michael Myers
University of Auckland
Maung Sein
Agder University College,
Doug Vogel
City Univ. of Hong Kong
Peter Wolcott
Univ. of Nebraska-Omaha

Don McCubbrey
University of Denver
Seev Neumann
Tel Aviv University
Carol Saunders
Univ. of Central Florida
Rolf Wigand
U. of Arkansas, Little Rock

Emannuel Monod
University of Nantes
Dan Power
University of No. Iowa
Peter Seddon
University of Melbourne
Upkar Varshney
Georgia State Univ.

John Mooney
Pepperdine University
Ram Ramesh
SUNY-Bufallo
Thompson Teo
National U. of Singapore
Vance Wilson
U.Wisconsin,Milwaukee

DEPARTMENTS
Global Diffusion of the Internet.
Editors: Peter Wolcott and Sy Goodman
Papers in French
Editor: Emmanuel Monod

Information Technology and Systems.
Editors: Alan Hevner and Sal March
Information Systems and Healthcare
Editor: Vance Wilson

ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL
Eph McLean
AIS, Executive Director
Georgia State University

Samantha Spears
Subscriptions Manager
Georgia State University

Reagan Ramsower
Publisher, CAIS
Baylor University

